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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

11166

RAYMOND STROHM,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Raymond Strohm, appeals from conviction
of the crimes of burglary in the third degree and grand
larccncy in the Third .Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Ut;ih, the Honorable Merrill C. Faux presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The jury found defendant guilty of burglary in the third
degree and grand larceny. He was sentenced in the Utah State
Prison for the indeterminate term as provided by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the Third
District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant was convicted of burglary in the third de-
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gr;:e and grand larceny after trial by JUry. The v1ct1m ot th,
offense was Delivery Service and Transfer Company of Salt
Lake City, Utah (T. 3).
During the trial, Nick Palukos, investigating officer witf
the Salt Lake City Police Department, testified that he interviewed the defend:mt on July 13 or 14 in the interrogation
room at the Salt L;lke County Jail ( T. 21) , where def en darn
was being held on another charge (T. 20). Defendant was
given a Miranda warning (T. 19), and defendant specifically
stated that he understood his rights and what the officer had
told him before entering into conversation (T. 21). Before
Officer Palukos was allowed to testify about the conversation
he had had with defendant, defense counsel requested and
was given permission to voir dire the witness. Testimony on
voir dire revealed that ( 1) the conversation took place on
July 13 or 14 in the city jail where defendant was being held
on another charge, ( 2) the defendant had indicated that he
understood his rights and had stated that he understood what
the officer told him before going into conversation (T. 21),
(3) that during the interrogation he did not request counsel
and ( 4) that at the time of the interrogation defendant was
ill. The officer gave an opinion that defendant was suffering
from narcotics withdrawal but that he appeared to be able
to concentrate fully on what was proceeding (T. 22).
After concluding voir dire examination, defense counsel
objected to any further testimony concerning the conversation
on the ground that defendant was undergoing narcotics withdrawal and that questioning under such circumstances would
amount to implied volition and implied coercion (T-22).
Counsel for the State replied to the objection stating that he
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1 hough t

the reason for the Miranda warning was to guard
,1gainst the defendant being forced into or tricked into a confession but that if through his own physical condition which
he li!rnsclf created and not through intin1idation or from some
external force, he places himself in a position where he conthe rules of £airplay are not violated and such an objection coulJ noc be used to keep an admission out of evidence
(T. 22).

After hearing d.irect testimony, voir dire testimony and
the arguments cf counsel ccncerning the nature of the confession, the court ruled that the defendant had been warned under the Miranda decision and was given the opportunity to ask
for counsel (T. 23). The court then allowed the state to pre~ent further testimony pcrtair,ing to the conversation between
Jcfembnt and Officer Palukos. The officer testified that during the ten minute interrogation, defendant "mentioned that
he, along with two o:her individuals, had gone to this building,
that he had stayed in the car while the other two individuals
entered the building; and they returned with the property,
placed it in the car, and they left the scene" (T. 23). Officer
Palukos further testified that defendant stated he sold the property to an undercover agent for the sheriff's department

(T. 33).
On cross-examination, the officer stated that defendant,
during the interrogation, was clear-thinking but was shaking
and tlut when asked how he felt, defendant replied that he
was okay, that he was all right (T. 24). The interrogation was
discontinued after ten minutes of questioning. The officer
stated to the defendant that he would return when defend;int
felt hetter.
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During the trial, Officer John Harvey Van Katwyk,
deputy for the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, testified tha·
he was engaged ~n undercover work involving defendan·
(T. 26), that he purch:ised the typewriter introduced inti
evidence as the stolen typewriter from defendant :it the sam1
time that he purchas<>d a stamp machine (T. 29).
During the trial, Lieutenant Paul LaBounty of the Salr
Lake County Sheriff's Office testified that at the time the de·
fondant was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail, defend,1m
stated, "Lieutenant (meaning Officer LaBounty), you better
check into your boys buying hot typewriters." (T. 36). Fur
ther testimony indicated the hot typewriter alluded to WJ•
the one purchased bv Officer Van Katwyk. (T. 3 6).
During the trial, the appellant-defendrnt took the stand ir1
his own beh;ilf and recalled having a conversation with Officer
Palukos in jail but could not recall any specific conversation•
regarding the burglary. He indicated that he had been on nar·
cotics for a period of two weeks prior to the time of arrest
was sick, and could not remember exactly what happened. Ht
further testified that Officer Palukos had the admission 01
the confession as to rhe burglary mixed up with other incident·
under investigation (T-47). Defendant testified that the stoler
items in question had been brought to him by Mike Martinel
and Ernie G:illego~. who had asked him to sell the tvpewriter
(T. 49).

ARGUMENT

POINT l
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED ON

nn

ADMISSIBILITY AND VOLUNT ARTNESS OF THE AP
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PELLANT'~ ADMISSION OR CONFESSION BEFORE ALLOWING THE SAME TO BE HEARD BY THE JURY.

Appellant's appeal is based on the allegation that the trial
wurt committed prcjvdicial error in ruling that the question
uf the voluntariness of the confession or admission is one for
the jury. The appeil:rnt further alleges that the trial court
violated defendant's right to due process and procedure of rules
set <lown by this court.
A review of the record will show that the confession or
:1dmission of defendant was heard by the jury only after the
judge had ruled as to its admissibility. Rather than have a separate hearing as to :idmissibility of the confession or admission
out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel chose to voir
dire Officer Palukos and object to introduction of any conver>ation the officer had with defendant. The voir dire examination included tcstimcny as to the time of the conversation, the
place of the conversation, the preliminary Miranda warning
and statements to the defendant. Defense counsel made objection to the introduction of further conversation and both sides
were given the opportunity to argue the law involved before
the judge made his ruling. Counsel for the St:<te's last sentence
before the court ruled was "I don't think this could be used
to keep this kind of statement out." (T. 23). "This" referred
to the argument by defense counsel that narcotics withdrawal
made defendant's statements involuntary and coercive. The
court's folI reply was "\'Vell, the court will rule that, as to
the warning under the Miranda decision, it appears he was
warned, giv~n an opportunity to ask for counsel. As to whether
o:· Dot what he said was voluntary is a question for the jury.
lJ nder rhe circumstances that this has developed here, whether
voluntary or coerced, would be a matter for the jury to deter-
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er.

mine."
2)). The 'circumstances" the judge alludes LO Jft
the events of the record which reveal that defendant was al
lowed to voir dire the State's witness, put evidence before th,
court as to the nature of the conversation and argue the legJ'
aspects of the matter before a trial judge. It Wc1S after thesr
"circumstances" that the judge ruled and allowed the State tu
proceed with the conversation between the officer and the defendant. It is obvious that the Judge ruled on the very question
of involuntariness and coercion in that he admitted the conversation into evidence for the consideration of the jury onlr
after the defendant had had the opportunity to object to it1
entry into evidence. Prior to the time of this ruling, the substance of a confession or admission was not before the jury. The
only testimony the jury had heard prior to the ruLng wa1
whether or not the narcotics withdraw::il was sufficient to keep
the officer from testifying about the conversation with defendmt.
After making the ruling prior to having the confession

OJ

admission heard by the jury, the judge then properly stated thar
the question of volu'1tarine's ;:md co-~rcion was one that the jury
must determine.

State

i·.

Crank, 105 Unh 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943) se[1

forth procedures and guidelines to be followed by the trd
court in determinir-ig the voluntariness of a confession or ~d
mission of 8 criminal defend:rnt before submirting the question
to

a jury. The court stated:
"\Vhen the state seeks to put the confession before the jury, it mmt establish its competency to the
court. To do this it must be shown that the confession
was given by the accused as his voluntary act; as an
expression d his independent and free will, uninflu-
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L·nu:d by tear or punishment or by hope o± reward;

that it was not induced or influenced by any advanta gcs or benefits that might accrue to him or those
near or dear to him, nor was it given to lighten any
penalties or punishments that the law might impose
upon him if tried and convicted without confessing;
th;ct it was n::•t given as a desire to escape or avoid
,my mioery., thre::tts, or conduct of any other person,
having it in the;r power, or whom he believed had it
in their pnwer, to inflict upon him, or upon whom
it was his duty or privilege to protect. This is a basic
;:ind comtitutionally gu;:iranteed right of the accused."

It is cl<::8r in the record that this b:isic and constitutionally guaranteed right of the accused was sJfeguarded and that
the court he;::rd evidence on the points listed above.
The appelbnt would have the court belie'.re that the actual
procedure followed in St,1tc Z'. Crank must be followe~ i11 al!
cases. The irnporr;mce in Side 1/, Crank is that it sets up the
basic and constitutiof'a Hv guaranteed rights of the 1ccused,
along with gv.:,_{~!inr:s for 5:ifeg•1arding those rights. In State v.
[rmdcn, 1 5 Urah 2d 64, 3 87 P.2d 240 ( 1963), th;, court cliscussed the question of what p;-ocedure was to be followed in
dct2rmining volunnrines:; of a confession. The court statrd:
"There is no statutory mandate as to the procedure to be followed. Nor should there be any rigid
::tnd inviolable one. The duty which evolves in the
trial court is to adopt and follow some procedure
which will guard against admission of spurious confessions or ::tdmissions. This h::td been varied somewhat
depending on the circumstmces of each case and the
court should li::ive considerable latitude of discretion
as how to protect the rights of the defendants in that
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regard. lf that purpose is served, the tact that the
course adopted may vary from some other procedure
which may have also been deemed permissible, should
not result in the reversal of the conviction."
Further elaborating- the court states:
"It must be borne in mind, the court has not only
the duty mentioned to the defendant, must also safeguard the rights of the state. Furthermore, it has the
responsibility of seeing that the trial moves forward in
an orderly manner and with such reasonable expedition as can be achieved consistent with looking after
the interests of both sides of the controversy. It would
be quite impractical to halt the main trial, excuse the
jury, and conduct a collateral trial on the question
of voluntariness of an admission or a confession every
time a defendant's counsel might make an objection.
While this has indeed been approved as proper procedure under circumstances which require it, it should
be done only when there is presented such genuine and
substantial issue as to voluntariness that in the court's
judgment there is some real possibility that permitting
the jury to hear the evidence would so prejudice their
minds that the defendant would not have a fair trial."

State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59, 296 P.2d 726 (1956)
states:
"Although the burden of proof as to the voluntariness of the confession lies with the party seeking to
use it as evidence, i.e., the prosecution, after the trial
court has decided from the evidence that the confession was voluntarily made, the appellate court will not
disturb that finding in the absence of a showing of
abuse of its discretion when there is no substantial
evidence from which it could reasonably so find. It
is clear from the record that the trial court did have
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evidence before it from which it could make a ruling
that the confession was voluntarily made."
It is submitted that the trial court committed no prejudicial error, nor violated any constitutionally guaranteed right
of the accused or abused its discretion. The judge was given
sufficient evidence through direct examination, voir dire examination and ~rguments of counsel of which to base a ruling
that the defendant received sufficient warning under the
Miranda decision and had had an opportunity to ask for counsel and that the fact that defendant was ill from narcotics
withdrawal was not sufficient to keep the confession from the
jury. After so ruling, the question then was one that was properlv for the jury to determine and to give weight to the question of voluntariness or coercion. This procedure adopted by
the trial court would meet the requirements of the orthodox
rule followed in Utah that the trial judge is to hear the evidence and rule for the purpose of admissibility of a confession
and that the jury is to consider voluntariness as it affects
weight or credibility of the confession as set forth in State v.
Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861 (1948); State v. Brosch,
119 Utah 450, 229 P.2d 289 (1951); State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah
2d 59, 296 P.2d 726 (1956); State 11 • Crank, 105 Utah 332,
142 P.2d 178 ( 194)) ; Stair z:. Louden, 1 5 Utah 2d 64, 3 87
P.2d 240 ( 1963).

In the present case, we are not faced with the situation
where the defendant has been tortured or subjected to long
periods of questioning. On the contrary, the defendant made
the confession or admission during a ten minute interrogation
for a crime other than the one for which he had been charged
and was in custody. His statements to the officer were that he
knew what he was doing, that he understood his rights and that
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he felt all right. These statements brought out in voir dire
testimony indicate a voluntary confession and is the type oi
evidence 'N bich the trial judge can take into consideration in
determining the voluntariness for the purpose of admissibility
of the confessicn. State l'. Londc11, supra, indicates that there
are many procedures tlnt can be followed by the trial court
in admittins an admission or confession into evidence. In the
present case, it was defense counsel who chose to voir dire and
·argue the p8int in the presence of the jury rather than ask
for a separ::i.te hearing. Defendant was given an opportunity
to present his side of the case during the trial.
Appellant's brief contains a discussion on United Staw
Supreme Court case of ]acksoll i'. Dcn110, 378 U.S. 368, 84
Sup.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 ( 1964), which the United States
Supreme Court set clown constitutional guidelines for the procedure relative to determining voluntariness of the confession.
The court held that the New York procedure for determining
voluntariness of a confession offered by the prosecution violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It should be pointed out that the procedure used by the New
York court, commonly called the "New York Rule" is different from i:he procedure used for many years by the Utah
courts commonly called the "\\7igmore" rule or the "Orthodox"
rule. It is submitted that the procedures long in use in this
State are in conformity with Jachson v. Denno, supra.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court did rule
on the ;;.dmis~ibility of the confession or admission before giving it to the jury. It is also eYident from the record that the
judge had mfficient evidence before him on which to make
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j

]11S ruling. It is submitted that the porcedure used by the trial
court to assemble the eYidence necessary on which to make a
ruling was ~!ltirely within his discretion and within the guidelines as set out in St.1te r. Louden, and other cases cited. It
should be stated th::it the petitioner has the burden of persuading the trial court by a preponderance of evidence acts which
will entitle him to relief. When the trial judge has made find;ngs of fac! and a iudgment thereon, they are entitled to the
presumption of correctness. On appeal, the evidence is sur\'eyed in the light favorable to them, and if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to support them, they will not be
overturned.

It is respectfully submitted that there has been no violation of defendant's rights and no prejudicial errors committed

by the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DON R. STRONG
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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